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THE EFFECT OF COMMERCIAL PRACTICE
RESTRICTIONS: THE CASE OF
OPTOMETRY*
DEBORAH HAAS-WILSON
Smith College
I.

INTRODUCTION

CURRENT regulatory policy toward the business practices of optometrists is based on the assumption that the market fails because (1) consumers are faced with the dilemma of selecting an optometrist without the
benefit of full information on the quality of goods and services provided
by available optometrists and (2) some optometrists exploit this asymmetric information between consumers and sellers by lowering quality.
This assumption has led to the inference that regulation of optometrists'
production and information dissemination processes is necessary to protect consumers from their own purchase decisions and from unfair seller
behavior. Examples of current commercial practice regulations include
state restrictions on (1) the employment of optometrists by nonprofessional corporations,' (2) the permissible locations of optometrists' offices,
(3) the operation of multiple offices by optometrists, and (4) the use of
trade names by optometrists employed by nonprofessional corporations.
Although there is theoretical support for the argument that asymmetric
consumer information about product quality will result in market failure,2
* I would like to thank Dennis Carlton, Richard Gilbert, Theodore Keeler, John Kushman, Richard Scheffler, Lawrence Wilson, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
Also I would like to thank the U.S. Federal Trade Commission for generously providing part
of the data base.
Professional corporations differ from nonprofessional corporations in that professional
corporation law requires each stockholder of a professional corporation to be a licensed
member of the profession for which the corporation is organized to practice. See, generally,
Seymour L. Coblens, Optometry and the Law (1976).
2
For example, George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488 (1970); Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and
Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1328 (1979); Richard
[Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XXIX (April 1986)]
? 1986 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/86/2901-0007$01.50
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the commercial practice restrictions imposed on optometrists are increasingly being perceived as a means to serve some optometrists' selfinterests rather than the "public interest." The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has argued that state restrictions on employment, location,
branch offices, and trade names serve some optometrists' self-interests by
restricting the growth of high-volume, chain vision-care outlets.3 Further
restrictions on optometrists' advertising have been shown to increase the
price of ophthalmic goods and services4 and to increase price without
increasing quality.5
While a large body of empirical evidence exists on the effect of advertising restrictions, little empirical evidence exists on the effects of other
commercial practice restrictions, such as the employment, location,
branch office, and trade name restrictions. Benham and Benham and the
FTC estimated the effect of the degree of professional control;6 however,
neither study measured professional control on the basis of the extent of
state commercial practice restrictions. Benham and Benham measured
professional control as (1) the proportion of optometrists within each state
belonging to the American Optometric Association (AOA), (2) the market
share of large chain optical firms, and (3) the assessment of five representatives of large chain optical firms of the "difficulty which a commercial
firm has entering and operating in a state for reasons other than competition with existing commercial firms."7 The FTC measured professional
control as the presence or absence of chain optical firms employing optometrists and as the type of media advertising observed in the area.8
Both the Benhams' and the FTC's studies are subject to the problem of

Schmalensee, A Model of Advertising and Product Quality, 86 J. Pol. Econ. 485 (1978);
Dennis E. Smallwood & John Conlisk, Product Quality in Markets Where Consumers Are
Imperfectly Informed, 93 Q. J. Econ. 1 (1979); and Charles Stuart, Consumer Protection in
Markets with Informationally Weak Buyers, 12 Bell J. Econ. 562 (1981).
3 Federal Trade
Commission, State Restrictions on Vision Care Providers: The Effects on
Consumers ("Eyeglasses II") (July 1980).
4 For
example, Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.
Law & Econ. 337 (1972).
5 For
example, Federal Trade Commission, Effects of Restrictions on Advertising and
Commercial Practice in the Professions: The Case of Optometry (September 1980); Roger
Feldman & James W. Begun, The Effects of Advertising: Lessons from Optometry, 13 J.
Hum. Resources 247 (Suppl. 1978); and John E. Kwoka, Advertising and the Price and
Quality of Optometric Services, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 211 (1984).
6 Lee Benham & Alexandra
Benham, Regulating through the Professions: A Perspective
on Information Control, 18 J. Law & Econ. 421 (1975); and Federal Trade Commission,
supra note 5.
7 Benham &
Benham, supra note 6, at 426-27.
8
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5, at 2.
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TABLE 1
CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS IN EARLIER STUDIES

Standard
Metropolitan
Statistical
Areas
Knoxville, Tenn.
Little Rock, Ark.
Providence, R.I.
Columbia, S.C.
Greensboro, N.C.
Milwaukee
Portland, Or.
Columbus, Ohio
Baltimore
Washington, D.C.
Seattle
Minneapolis

FTC
Classification of
Restrictiveness*

Benham &
Benham
Classificationt

Number of Pearle
Vision Center/
Texas State
Optical Stores
by State, 1983

Most
Most
Most
Next most
Next most
Next most
Next least
Next least
Least
Least
Least
Least

Restrictive
Restrictive
Not included
Restrictive
Restrictive
Other
Other
Nonrestrictive
Nonrestrictive
Nonrestrictive
Other
Nonrestrictive

27
13
2
15
18
11
0
24
34
1
5
20

SouRcEs.-Federal
TradeCommission,Effectsof Restrictionson AdvertisingandCommercialPractice
in the Professions:The Case of Optometry41, table 2-1 (September1980).Lee Benham& Alexandra
Benham,Regulatingthroughthe Professions:A Perspectiveon InformationControl,18J. Law & Econ.
421, 426-27 n.14 (1975).PearleHealth Services, Inc., Prospectus12 (September16, 1983).
* A StandardMetropolitanStatisticalArea(SMSA)was classifiedas "most restrictive"if chainfirms
and advertisingwere not observed,as "next most restrictive"if nonpriceadvertisingof eyeglasseswas
observed,as "next least restrictive"if nonpriceadvertisingof eyeglassesandexamsandchainfirmswere
observed,and as "least restrictive"if price advertisingof eyeglasses and chainfirmswere observed.
t A state was classifiedas "restrictive"if at least one representativeof the commercialfirmssurveyed
includedit amongthe most difficultstates and as "nonrestrictive"if at least one respondentincludedit
amongthe least difficultstates. The remainingstates were designatedas "other."

errors in variables. Certain states that are classified laissez-faire may
actually be restrictive, and certain states classified as highly restrictive
may be less restrictive.9 Table 1 shows that states included by the
Benhams in the most restrictive category are not included in the FTC's
most restrictive category. And each study classifies states as least restrictive that the other study does not.10 Further, there is a weak relationship
between both the Benhams' and the FTC's classifications of markets by
9 For example, the FTC classified Seattle as least restrictive, yet optometrists in Washington State are subject to three commercial practice restrictions, namely, the employment
restriction by court order, the location restriction by state board regulation, and the trade
name restriction by statute. Little Rock, Arkansas, was classified as riost restrictive, yet
optometrists in Arkansas are subject to only the employment restriction. Benham &
Benham, supra note 6, at 426.
'o The Benhams mention in a footnote that even the five representatives of the large
commercial firms did not always agree on which states should be included in the restrictive
and nonrestrictive categories. Benham & Benham, supra note 6, at 426.
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restrictiveness and the presence of commercial optical firms, measured as
the number of retail optical stores operated or franchised by Pearle Health
Services, the largest retailer of ophthalmic goods and services in the
United States. 1
This study does not attempt to classify states by restrictiveness and, as
a result, is not plagued by a similar errors-in-variables problem. This
paper estimates the effect of the presence of specific commercial practice
restrictions. The restriction is present in a state if it is imposed by state
statute, board of optometry regulation, court decision, or attorney general
opinion.12 The effects of the restrictions will depend on enforcement, but
measurement of the presence of restrictions by state does not.13
Accordingly, after a brief description of the market for ophthalmic
goods and services and an analysis of the commercial practice restrictions, this paper presents an econometric study of the economic effect of
the employment, location, branch office, and trade name restrictions. In
particular, the effects of these restrictions on the price and quality of eye
examinations and eyeglasses provided by optometrists are analyzed in
markets characterized by different levels of consumer information and
entry barriers. Further, this research provides a preliminary test of a
recent amendment to the economic theory of regulation-that the regulatory process can be used as a strategic weapon by subgroups of firms
within an industry against other subgroups within that industry.
II.

THE MARKETFOROPHTHALMIC
GOODSAND SERVICES

Most optometrists are self-employed; however, the market share of layemployed optometrists (optometrists employed by drug and department
stores and other nonprofessional optical firms) is increasing. In 1977, 80
" This is due in part to the difference between the FTC's classification criteria, the
presence of optical firms employing optometrists, and Pearle Health Service's marketing
strategy. "The Companies' marketing strategy is premised upon the availability of optometric services at or near the location of the retail optical store. ... In nine states of the
United States, the Company employs optometrists to provide eye examinations and related
services. In most other jurisdictions in which the Company operates stores, the Company
leases space adjacent to the retail optical store to an optometrist who provides these services." Pearle Health Services, Inc., Prospectus, 11-13 (September 16, 1983).
12 Certain state
optometric associations' rules of practice and codes of ethics also suggest
ways to establish and maintain one's practice; however, the private association's only
enforcement mechanism is expulsion from membership. Many optometrists choose not to
belong in the first place.
13
The commercial practice restriction data were obtained from the July 1980 FTC report
("Eyeglasses II") and then cross-checked with the state optometry laws listed in the 1978
Blue Book of Optometrists. A further check was made by writing to each state board of
optometry and state optometric association.
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percent of all optometrists were self-employed, 4 percent were employed
by professional corporations, 2 percent by nonprofessional corporations,
and 14 percent by the government, other optometrists, or ophthalmologists.14 Between 1973 and 1984 the market share of optical chain firms
increased from 3 to 15 percent in the market for eye examinations and
from 7 to 20 percent in the market for eye wear.15
Many self-employed optometrists and optometrists employed by professional corporations oppose the provision of ophthalmic services by
nonprofessional optical firms. Lay-employed optometrists, opponents argue, may employ a variety of cost-cutting techniques, such as providing
brief and inadequate eye examinations, in order to increase profits. Further, lay-employed optometrists practicing under a trade name lack personal accountability and the need to maintain a personal reputation for
high-quality service. Opponents also argue that the management of nonprofessional optical firms may interfere in the doctor-patient relationship
and with professional judgments concerning patient welfare. Thus opponents argue that commercial practice restrictions are necessary to prevent
lay-employed optometrists from increasing their market share by selling
services at lower prices and substituting low- for high-quality care without
consumer recognition of this change in quality.16
III.

COMMERCIALPRACTICE RESTRICTIONSIN OPTOMETRY

Optometric jurisprudence is state oriented. All states and the District of
Columbia require the licensure of optometrists. The state licensing statutes define the functions of the optometric profession and limit the performance of these functions to licensed persons. The state licensing statutes
also provide for the establishment of state boards of examiners in optometry to perform licensing and regulatory functions. The state boards
are authorized to issue rules and regulations, to define requirements for
licensure, and to discipline persons who have violated the licensing statutes. Where state laws do not delineate specific grounds for license suspension or revocation, the state boards are usually empowered to define
"unprofessional" or "unethical" conduct, which is grounds for license
suspension or revocation in most states.
This state-by-state self-regulation has resulted in wide cross-sectional
variation in the type of commercial practice restrictions placed on op14

U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, & Welfare, Bureau of Health Management, Supply of
Optometrists in the United States, Current and Future 16 (October 1978).
15
Pearle Health Services, Inc., Annual Report 4 (1983).
16
See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 3, at 29-35.
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tometrists. Table 2 shows that, in 1980, state laws, regulations, attorney
general opinions, and court decisions existed in thirty-seven states concerning the employment of optometrists by nonprofessional firms, in
twenty-eight states concerning the permissible locations of optometrists'
offices, in twenty-two states concerning the number of branch offices an
optometrist may operate, and in forty-one states concerning the ability of
optometrists employed by nonprofessional firms to practice under a trade
name.
The employment restrictions usually provide that it is unprofessional
conduct or an illegal practice for an optometrist to accept employment
from an unlicensed person or firm. For example, the provision in the
North Carolina statute reads: "[A]nd it shall be likewise unlawful for any
corporation, lay body, organization, group, or lay individual to engage, or
undertake to engage, in the practice of optometry through means of engaging the services, upon a salary or commission basis, of one licensed to
practice optometry or medicine in any of its branches in this State. Likewise, it shall be unlawful for any optometrist licensed under the provisions of this Article to undertake to engage in the practices of optometry
as a salaried or commissioned employee of any corporation, lay body,
organization, group, or lay individual."17
Restrictions on location usually provide that it is unprofessional conduct or an illegal practice to work in an office not devoted exclusively to
the practice of optometry or some other health care profession or in which
materials are displayed pertaining to a commercial undertaking not related to the practice of optometry. For example, the provision in the
South Carolina statute reads: "Any person registered as provided for in
this chapter may have his certificate of registration revoked or suspended
by the board for . . . [f]ailure to have their offices for the practice of
in offices separate and distinct from any business organioptometry,...
zation, with doors leading directly to the street, or public halls leading
directly to the street. They shall not practice or operate in or on premises
where any material other than those necessary to render their services are
dispensed to the public."'8
Branch office restrictions usually set a maximum number of branch
offices an optometrist may operate or require the optometrist to be in
personal attendance a certain proportion of the time the office is open to
the public. The California statute reads: "Nothing in this chapter shall
prevent an optometrist from owning, maintaining or operating more than
one branch office if he is in personal attendance at each of his offices fifty
17

18

N.C. Admin. Code, ? 90-125.
S.C. Code Ann., No. 56-1077.

TABLE 2
PRACTICE
RESTRICTIONS
BYSTATE,1980
COMMERCIAL

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New MexicoS
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
TexasS*
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
WisconsinS*
Wyoming

Employment
Restriction
S*...
R
R
S
S
S
S
S, R
S, R
...
S
S, R
...
S
C
S, R, C
R, C
C
S
S*
S
S*
A, S*
R, C, A
...
S
...
S
S
S, R
C
S
S
R, C
S
...
R
S
...
S, S*
S
C
A
S, R
C
R, S
S*

Branch Office
Restriction

Trade Name
Restriction

S
S, R
R

S
R
R, S*

S
...
R
...

R, S*
R

R
R
S
R
...
...
...
...
...

R
R, C
...
R
...
...
...
S, R

S, R
R
S
R, S*
S
R
S*
S, R
S

S
.
R
......
.
R
R
R

S

S

R, A

S, R
R

Location
Restriction
R
...
...
...
R
S
S, R

S, R
R
S
...
...
R
...
...
S, R
..
R
S
S, R
R
S
S
R
...
S
R
S
......
......

.
R
...
...
...
.
C
...
...
R
...
A
R
R
R, S*
...
R
...
S
S
...
S
...
...
...

R

R
S
R, S*
R
S
S
R
S
R
R
S
S*
R
S, R
S, R
S, R
S
S
S
R, S*
S, R
S*
S, R

SOURCE.-Federal
TradeCommission,State Restrictionson Vision Care Providers:The Effects on
Consumers("Eyeglasses II") 28 (July 1980).
NOTE.-C = court decision, S = statutory restriction, S* = ambiguous statute, A = attorney general
opinion, and R = state board regulation.
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percent (50%) of the time during which such office is open for the practice
of optometry."19
Trade name restrictions usually provide that an optometrist's license to
practice may be revoked or suspended for practicing under a name other
than his or her own name or under a false or assumed name. However,
trade name restrictions
generallydo not preventan optometristfromworkingfor anotheroptometristand
holdinghim or herself out underthe name of the professionalcorporation.Thus,
these restrictionshave a distinct discriminatoryimpact on non-professionalcorporations.(The discriminatoryimpacthere is not that a professionalcorporation
is able to use a traditionaltradenamebut ratherthat an individualoptometristcan
hold him or herself out under a firm name which does not contain his or her
individualname so long as that firmis a professionalcorporationor the nameof a
licensed optometristwho employs that individualoptometrist.)20
The existence of commercial practice restrictions in the market for
ophthalmic services is consistent with the economic theory of regulation
and with recent literature on strategic use of the regulatory process by
subgroups of firms within an industry. According to the economic theory
of regulation, regulation can be used as a device for transferring income
from groups with less political power to groups with more, usually from
consumers to the politically powerful regulated industry.21 Firms in the
regulated industry are assumed to be homogeneous and therefore equally
benefited by the regulation and equally interested in promoting the regulation.
Recently, the economic theory of regulation has been extended to include heterogeneous firms and thus the idea that regulations impose different benefits and costs on firms within the industry.22 Assuming that
heterogeneous firms form subgroups,23 regulation can be viewed as a
19 Cal. [Bus. & Prof.] Code ? 3007(i) (Deering).
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 3, at 23-24.
21
See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. Law & Econ.
211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt.
Sci. 335 (1974); and George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ.
& Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).
22
See Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental
Quality Regulation, 25 J. Law & Econ. 99 (1982); Sharon Oster, The Strategic Use of
Regulatory Investment by Industry Sub-groups, 20 Econ. Inquiry 604 (1982); and Steven C.
Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 267 (1983).
23
See Richard E. Caves & Michael E. Porter, From Entry Barriers to Mobility Barriers:
Conjectural Decisions and Contrived Deterrence to New Competition, 91 Q. J. Econ. 421
(1977); Howard H. Newman, Strategic Groups and the Structure-Performance Relationship,
60 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 417 (1978); and Michael E. Porter, The Structure within Industries
and Companies' Performance, 61 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 214 (1979).
20
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device for transferring income from subgroups of firms with less political
power to those with more. Politically powerful firms can use the regulatory process as a strategic weapon against other groups of firms within the
industry. Oster wrote, "As long as there is some initial difference among
firms in an industry, different firms in that industry may push for regulations which increase the relative rate of return to their peculiar characteristics. ... [T]he firm may even encourage a regulation which lowers its
short-term profits if that regulation simultaneously reduces the ability of
its rival to compete effectively."24
Salop and Scheffman make a more general argument and mention regulation as one way to increase rivals' costs: "It is better to compete against
high-cost firms than low-cost ones. Thus, raising rivals' costs can be
profitable even if the rival does not exit from the market. ... A highercost rival quickly reduces output, allowing the predator to immediately
raise price or market share."25
Strategic use of the regulatory process is quite possible in the
ophthalmic industry. Optometrists regulate themselves,26 and the optometrists appointed to the state regulatory boards are not appointed at
random. Board members in forty-six states are appointed by the governor
from lists of optometrists who have practiced optometry in the state for a
specified number of years. In sixteen states, the optometry statutes designate membership in the state optometric association as a prerequisite for
appointment, or they require the governor to make appointments from
lists submitted by the state optometric association.27 Further, the industry
consists of differentiated subgroups of firms. Size, marketing strategy,
and level of vertical integration differentiate self-employed optometrists
from lay-employed optometrists.
IV.

THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF COMMERCIALPRACTICE RESTRICTIONS

The employment restriction prevents nonprofessional optical firms
from employing optometrists and therefore from selling eye examinations
and eyeglass prescriptions (that is, offering the one-stop service of dis24

Oster, supra note 22, at 606.
Salop & Scheffman, supra note 22, at 267.
26
The state optometric boards are composed entirely of optometrists in twenty-six states
and the District of Columbia: twelve states require only one lay member, eleven states
require only two lay members, and California requires three lay members on the board.
Council of State Governments, Health Licensure Boards: Public Membership (1981), at
table 1.
27
Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report on Advertising of Ophthalmic Goods and
Services and Proposed Trade Regulation Rule (16 CFR Part 456) 34-35 (May 1977).
25
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pensing optometrists). To the extent that there are economies of scope in
the joint production of eye examinations and eyeglasses, the employment
restriction forces nonprofessional optical firms to incur the higher cost of
producing eyeglasses alone. Thus the employment restriction may deter
entry by potential nonprofessional optical firms. However, the employment restriction does not prevent the nonprofessional firm from locating
close to an optometrist.
The trade name restriction prevents lay-employed optometrists from
including trade names in their advertising. Since consumers can use trade
names as a substitute for search or as an aid in processing information
about different sellers, the trade name restriction decreases the effectiveness of advertising by nonprofessional optical firms. This may reduce
the ability of nonprofessional optical firms to attract new customers and
realize scale economies. Like the employment restriction, the trade name
restriction may also deter entry by potential nonprofessional optical
firms.
The location restriction prevents self-employed and lay-employed optometrists from locating in high-traffic, high-visibility areas such as shopping centers and department stores. This reduces the ability of all optometrists to develop high-volume practices and realize economies of
scale. Lay-employed optometrists, however, tend to rely more heavily
than self-employed optometrists on convenient locations to attract customers.28 Therefore, lay-employed optometrists are more likely to be constrained by the location restriction.
The branch office restriction prevents self-employed and lay-employed
optometrists from expanding their practices by opening new offices. To
the extent the branch office regulation is binding, optometrists are prevented from utilizing the cost-minimizing combination of inputs. With
data from the dental industry, DeVany, Gramm, Saving, and Smithson29
show that input regulation increases the ratio of unrestricted to restricted
inputs.
The preceding discussion focuses on the commercial practice restrictions' effects on self- and lay-employed optometrists' production costs.
Two of the four restrictions, the employment and trade name restrictions,
may increase the costs of production for lay-employed optometrists. The
28
Support for this suggestion is found in the Prospectus of Pearle Health Services, Inc.
"They [retail stores] are generally located in high traffic areas convenient to customers,
typically in shopping malls, strip shopping centers or freestanding buildings in major shopping areas." Pearle Health Services, Inc., supra note 11 at 11.
29 Arthur S.
DeVany, Wendy L. Gramm, Thomas R. Saving, & Charles W. Smithson,
The Impact of Input Regulation: The Case of the U.S. Dental Industry, 25 J. Law & Econ.
367 (1982).
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location and branch office restrictions may increase the costs of production for self-employed and lay-employed optometrists; however, it can be
argued that the location and branch office restrictions differentially damage lay-employed optometrists. In addition, the analysis suggests that the
restrictions may deter entry by nonprofessional optical firms.30 The expected result, if this is true, is higher prices.
The hypothesis to be tested, then, is that the commercial practice restrictions have tended to increase eye examination and eyeglass prices.
However, the major justification for the restrictions is elimination of lowquality services. Accordingly, the empirical analysis also examines the
effect of the restrictions on quality. A hedonic regression is estimated to
test the effects of the restrictions on quality-adjusted price. The qualityadjusted price is defined as the price of an eye examination and pair of
eyeglasses of a given quality and is revealed to consumers from observed
prices of eye examinations and eyeglasses and the level of quality associated with them.
V.

THE MODEL

When information is costly, the relevant market structure is monopolistic competition rather than perfect competition.31 Accordingly, the
ophthalmic industry is modeled as a monopolistically competitive industry.32
Assuming optometrists choose price and quality jointly, the qualityadjusted price, QUALP/, charged by optometrist j is a function of optometrist j's marginal cost, MCJ, and price elasticity of demand, e,:
QUALPj = f[MCi(INPUT, R-EMPLOY, R-LOCATE,
R-BRANCH, R-TN), ej(Aj, AD, OPTOM)],
where INPUT is the price of inputs, R-EMPLOY is the employment
restriction, R-LOCATE is the location restriction, R-BRANCH is the
branch office restriction, R-TN is the trade name restriction, A, is the
3) Support for this
suggestion is found in the Prospectus of Pearie Health Services, Inc.
"Management believes that these efforts [Federal Trade Commission proceedings that may
result in rules that would preempt restrictions], if successful, would facilitate increased
market penetration by the Company in those jurisdictions." Pearle Health Services, Inc.,
supra note 11, at 16.
31 See Steven Salop, Information and Monopolistic Competition, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 240
(1976).
32 See also Mark V.
Pauly & Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Pricing of Primary Care Physicians' Services: A Test of the Role of Consumer Information, 12 Bell J. Econ. 488 (1981).
Pauly and Satterthwaite classify the market for primary medical care as monopolistically
competitive "because physicians are price setters and metropolitan areas contain sufficient
numbers of competitive physicians to eliminate oligopolistic interactions." Id. at 489.
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level of advertising chosen by optometrist j, AD is competitors' advertising expenditures, and OPTOM is the number of optometrists in the market area. As discussed earlier, R-EMPLOY and R-TN may increase costs
for lay-employed optometrists, and R-LOCATE and R-BRANCH may
increase costs for self- and lay-employed optometrists. The price elasticity of demand depends on the number of sellers33 and the level of advertising.34 Further, it is expected that GQUALPj/8MCj> 0, GQUALPj/Gej< 0,
and ?MCi/8INPUT > 0.
Not all optometrists decide to advertise. The advertising choice of optometristj is assumed to be a function of QUALPj,35 competitors' advertising expenditures,36 and the trade name restriction:
(2)
Aj = g(QUALPj, AD, R-TN).
The signs of all three variables are ambiguous. For example, R-TN makes
advertising by lay-employed optometrists less effective. As a result, the
lay-employed optometrist may decide to advertise less or may decide to
advertise more to compensate for less-effective advertising messages.
Professionals' location decisions depend on demand for their services,
measured as per capita income,37 state licensure requirements,38 the supply of competing professionals,39 and the regulatory environment.40 Accordingly, it is assumed that the number of self- and lay-employed optometrists is a function of per capita income, Y, the difficulty of the state
licensing examination, EXAM, the supply of opticians, OPTIC, and the
four commercial practice restrictions:
OPTOM = b(Y, EXAM, OPTIC, R-EMPLOY,
R-LOCATE, R-BRANCH, R-TN).
33

(3)

Pauly & Satterthwaite, supra note 32.
See, for example, Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 729
(1974).
35 See, for
example, Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael H. Riordan, Advertising as a Signal,
92 J. Pol. Econ. 427 (1984); and Nelson, supra note 34.
36 See Michael
Waterson, Economic Theory of Industry 131 (1984).
37 See, for example, L. Benham, A. Maurizi, & M. W. Reder, Migration, Location and
Remuneration of Medical Personnel: Physicians and Dentists, 50 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 332
(1968); and Alfred Meltzer, Kathryn Langwell, Michael Keane, & Shelly Nelson, Report on
the Geographic Distribution of Vision Care Providers (unpublished report, Applied Management Sciences, Inc., 1983).
38
See, for example, Benham, Maurizi, & Reder, supra note 37; and H. E. Frech III,
Occupational Licensure and Health Care Productivity: The Issues and the Literature, in
Health Manpower and Productivity: The Literature and Required Future Research (John
Rafferty ed. 1974).
39 See, for example, Meltzer, Langwell, Keane, & Nelson, supra note 37.
40
See, for example, id.
34
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It is expected that 8OPTOM/ Y > 0, GOPTOM/8OPTIC < 0, and
GOPTOM/8EXAM < 0. As discussed earlier, R-EMPLOY and R-TN may
deter entry by lay-employed optometrists, and R-LOCATE and RBRANCH may deter entry by self- and lay-employed optometrists.
From equations (1), (2) and (3), quality-adjusted price, advertising, and
number of optometrists are simultaneously determined by AD and eight
exogenous variables.41 Competitors' advertising expenditures are endogenous, so an instrumental variable, the presence or absence of media advertising by optometrists in the market, ADVERT, is used in the estimation of equation (4). The state commercial practice restrictions may affect
the level of optometrists' advertising expenditures but not whether optometrists choose to advertise in that state. The 1977 Supreme Court
ruling in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona allows professionals, regardless of
their state's statutes, to advertise.42 Accordingly, the effects of the commercial practice restrictions on quality-adjusted price are estimated using
the following equation:
QUALPj = h(ADVERT, R-EMPLOY, R-LOCATE,
R-BRANCH, R-TN, EXAM, OPTIC,

(4)

Y, INPUT).
VI.

THE DATA

The data sources and the means and standard deviations of the variables are listed in Table 3. Data on the price, quality, and advertising of
ophthalmic goods and services were derived from an FTC data set, which
includes data on the price and quality of eye examinations and eyeglasses
purchased from 280 optometrists in twelve Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs).43 To collect the data the FTC trained nineteen professional survey interviewers to identify the procedures and equipment
used in eye examinations44 and then sent the interviewers to optometrists'
41
The state commercial practice restrictions may also be endogenous. For a detailed
discussion, see J. Begun, E. Crowe, & R. Feldman, Occupational Regulation in the States:
A Causal Model, 6 J. Health Pol., Pol'y, & L. 229 (1981). Endogeneity of the restrictions,
however, will entail only a small bias in the ordinary least squares estimators if the variance
of the errors is small relative to the variance of the regulatory variables. See, for example,
G. S. Maddala, Econometrics 153 (1977).
42
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
43
Baltimore; Columbia, South Carolina; Columbus, Ohio; Greensboro-HighpointWinston-Salem, North Carolina; Knoxville, Tennessee; Little Rock, Arkansas; Milwaukee;
Minneapolis-St. Paul; Portland, Oregon; Providence, Rhode Island; Seattle; and Washington, D.C.
44
During the training period, the interviewers were also given eye examinations so there
would be independent opinions regarding the corrective lenses each subject required for
proper vision.
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TABLE 3
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES

Variable
PRICE
THOROUGH
ACPRESC
ADVERT
R-TN
R-LOCATE
R-BRANCH
R-EMPLOY
EXAM
OPTIC
Y
INPUT

Definition
Price of exam and
glasses
Thoroughness of exam
Accuracy of prescription
Media advertising observed
Trade name restriction
Location restriction
Branch office restriction
Employment restriction
Subjects in licensing
exam
Optician/population
ratio
Per capita income
Hourly wage ratemanufacturing

Mean

Standard
Deviation

79.58

13.51

57.56
.83

20.96
.37

.78

.41

.52
.38
.27

.50
.49
.45

.52
10.53

.50
4.05

7.12

4.42

8438.78
4.06

992.28
.64

THOROUGH,ACPRESC,and ADVERTcomputedfrom data providedby Federal
SOURCES.-P,
TradeCommission,Effects of Restrictionson Advertisingand CommercialPracticein the Professions:
The Case of Optometry(September1980);R-TN,R-LOCATE,R-BRANCH,andR-EMPLOYcompiled
from data in FederalTradeCommission,State Restrictionson Vision Care Providers:The Effects on
Consumers("EyeglassesII") 28 (July 1980);EXAMcompiledfromdatain U.S. Departmentof Health,
underPartB of Medicarefor Certain
Education,and Welfare,Reportto the Congress:Reimbursement
ServicesProvidedby Optometrists(July1976);OPTICfromU.S. Departmentof Health,Education,and
Welfare,OpticiansEmployedin the Health Services, U.S., 1968(1968); Y from U.S. Departmentof
Commerce,Bureauof EconomicAnalysis, Survey of CurrentBusiness(April1981);and INPUT from
U.S. Departmentof Commerce,Bureauof the Census, State and MetropolitanArea Data Book (1979).

offices to purchase examinations and eyeglasses in November and December 1977. The interviewers purchased the eye examinations and eyeglasses from 189 self-employed optometrists and ninety-one optometrists
employed by drug and department stores and other nonprofessional optical firms.
Local newspapers were scanned from May 1977 to December 1977 to
determine the extent of media advertising of eye examinations and eyeglasses in the twelve SMSAs.45 Media advertising was observed in nine of
the twelve SMSAs. Optometrists were observed advertising on-site with
either large signs or window displays in all twelve SMSAs.
Price is measured as the sum of the price of an eye examination and
the price of a pair of eyeglasses. The joint price is used because, when the
45 There was no media advertising observed in Knoxville, Tennessee, Little Rock, Arkansas, and Providence, Rhode Island.
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exam and glasses are purchased as a package, it is possible that the
itemization of charges is arbitrary.
Quality is measured as the thoroughness of eye examination, THOROUGH, and as the accuracy of the eyeglass prescription, ACPRESC.
Thoroughness of the eye examination is an index that measures inputs
(procedures performed in the examination) rather than outputs (the optometrist's ability to discover all relevant information about the consumer's eye health). The index, developed by Dr. Kenneth Myers (Director of
the Optometric Service, Department of Medicine and Surgery, U.S. Veterans Administration), was constructed by weighting each test or procedure by a value proportional to its importance in the examination.
Accuracy of the prescription is a measure of the clinical judgment of
consultants at the State University of New York, College of Optometry,
and at the Pennsylvania College of Optometry as to the appropriateness of
the prescriptions. The consultants compared their opinions regarding the
corrective lenses each subject required for proper vision with the written
prescriptions from optometrists and then evaluated the prescriptions for
the adequacy with which subjects' visual needs were met.
With respect to the other independent variables, EXAM is measured as
the number of subject areas that must be included in the state licensing
examination, INPUT is measured as the average SMSA wage rate of
production workers in the manufacturing sector, and OPTIC is measured
as the ratio of opticians to 100,000 population in the state.
VII.

THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Equation (4) is estimated in double-log form using two specifications
and two dependent variables. The results of regressions on price are
reported in Table 4, while the results of regressions on quality are reported in Table 5. In the first specification the four commercial practice
restrictions are included as dummy variables that equal one if the restriction is present in the state and zero otherwise. In the second specification
the restrictions are included as dummy variables, and an index of the
degree of state regulation of optometry, REG, is interacted with quality
and media advertising. The variable REG is constructed by summing the
dummy commercial practice restriction variables by state. This summated scale assigns equal weight to each restriction and ranges from zero
to four. Thus the potential interaction between quality choice and the
restrictions and the interaction between media advertising and regulatory
effect are included in the second specification.46
46
Advertising may permit the realization of production scale economies that might otherwise be unobtainable because of market imperfections or regulation.
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TABLE 4
REGRESSIONS
ON PRICE, HOLDINGQUALITYCONSTANT

Independent
Variable
CONSTANT
INPUT
y
OPTIC
EXAM
ADVERT
R-TN
R-LOCATE
R-BRANCH
R-EMPLOY
THOROUGH

A*
- 1.4413
(.98)
.8082
(2.51)
.4888
(2.88)
-.1878
(6.02)
.1805
(4.80)
-.3038
(2.59)
.0607
(.48)
- .0015
(.01)
.1545
(1.13)
-.1592
(4.83)
.1110
(4.59)

ACPRESC
REG x ADVERT
REG x THOROUGH

Bt
-.9728
(.62)
.9557
(2.79)
.4123
(2.26)
-.1814
(5.54)
.1719
(4.21)
- .3305
(2.65)
.0182
(.14)
.0277
(.24)
.2177
(1.50)
-.1330
(3.62)
.1163
(4.40)
...
.0070
(.24)
...
...

Ct
-13.8777
(3.45)
.7107
(2.23)
1.8315
(4.18)
- .5065
(5.02)
.3617
(5.48)
.3883
(1.63)
.4362
(2.59)
.0860
(.80)
.5687
(3.14)
.1624
(1.59)
.1064
(4.47)
...

D*

Et

-1.4378
(.98)
.8117
(2.52)
.4767
(2.80)
-.1863
(5.96)
.1807
(4.80)
- .3046
(2.59)
.1181
(.83)
.0536
(.43)
.2080
(1.39)
-.1072
(1.59)
.1358
(3.67)

-14.1398
(3.51)
.7130
(2.24)
1.8453
(4.21)
-.5116
(5.06)
.3659
(5.54)
.4022
(1.68)
.5153
(2.82)
.1561
(1.25)
.6621
(3.33)
.2337
(1.94)
.1370
(3.77)

- .0139
(.88)

- .3912
(3.38)
-.0172
(1.11)

- .3830
(3.31)

NOTE.-t-statisticsare in parentheses.
* N = 280, R2 = .23.
t N = 253, R2 = .23.
$ N = 280, R2 = .26.

Because of the collinearity among the commercial practice restrictions,47 the individual coefficients cannot be estimated precisely; however, the sum of the coefficients on the regulatory variables can be estimated with considerable accuracy. This sum provides a reliable estimate
of the regulatory effect.48
47 High zero-order correlations are a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the
existence of multicollinearity. The trade name restriction is highly correlated with the location, the branch office, and the employment restrictions (r = 0.82, 0.52, and 0.54, respectively).
48 See Maddala, supra note 41, at 189.
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TABLE 5
REGRESSIONS
ON QUALITY

Independent
Variable
CONSTANT
INPUT
y
OPTIC
EXAM
ADVERT
R-TN
R-LOCATE
R-BRANCH
R-EMPLOY
REG x ADVERT
NoTE.-t-statistics

(1)*

(2)*

2.9616
(.93)
.1384
(.24)
.1401
(.38)
-.1325
(1.93)
.0513
(.63)
- .2702
(1.26)
- .1656
(.67)
- .0509
(.25)
.0640
(.25)
- .0254
(.39)

-7.3147
(.83)
- .0037
(.01)
1.2572
(1.30)
- .3848
(1.81)
.2000
(1.39)
.2865
(.58)
.1684
(.46)
- .0031
(.01)
.3900
(1.08)
.2143
(1.06)
- .3056
(1.25)

. . .

are in parentheses.

* N = 434, R2 = .05.

Results of ordinary least squares regressions that test the effects of the
restrictions on price, controlling for differences in quality, are reported in
Table 4. The coefficients on the dummy variables can be interpreted as
percentage changes and those on the other variables as elasticities. Regression A and regressions C-E include one measure of quality, THOROUGH, while regression B includes two quality measures, THOROUGH
and ACPRESC. Further, regression C allows for an interaction between
the degree of state regulation of optometry and media advertising by
optometrists; regression D allows for an interaction between the degree of
state regulation of optometry and optometrists' quality decisions; and
regression E allows for both interactions.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that state commercial
practice restrictions increase the price of ophthalmic goods and services,
holding quality constant. The sum of the coefficients on the regulatory
variables in regression A suggests a positive 5.5 percent difference in the
price of an eye examination and pair of eyeglasses in fully regulated
versus nonregulated states. Similarly, the summed coefficients for regres-
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sions B-E resulted in positive 13.1, 7.3, 5.1, and 7.0 percent differences,
respectively, in fully regulated states. In all five regressions the hypothesis that the effect of the commercial practice regulations is equal to
zero can be rejected at the 1 percent level of significance (F = 8.14, 7.52,
11.18, 8.33, and 11.50, respectively).
With respect to the relationship between price and quality, the price of
an eye examination and a pair of eyeglasses increases with the thoroughness of the eye examination but not with the accuracy of the eyeglass
prescription. A 1 percent increase in the thoroughness of the eye examination results in a 0.11-0.12 percent increase in the price of an eye examination and pair of eyeglasses. The coefficient on ACPRESC, however, is
not significantly different from zero. This suggests that prices convey
information on one aspect of product quality, thoroughness of the examination, but prices do not convey information on a second aspect of quality, prescription accuracy. A possible explanation of this is that consumers can assess thoroughness but not prescription accuracy.
In all five regressions media advertising by optometrists is associated
with lower prices, controlling for quality differences. Prices are approximately 26.3-33.1 percent lower in markets in which price or nonprice
media advertising by optometrists is observed. This is consistent with the
FTC's finding that the average price charged for eyeglasses and eye examinations is $23.74 lower in markets in which price advertising and chain
optical firms are observed.49 The coefficient on the optician-to-population
ratio is also negative and statistically significant in all regressions. Further, in all five regressions more rigorous licensing examinations, higher
per capita income, and higher input costs are associated with higher
prices, controlling for quality differences. For example, a 1 percent increase in the number of subject areas that must be covered in the state
licensing examination results in a 0.17-0.37 percent increase in price.
Table 5 reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions that test
the effects of the commercial practice restrictions on quality, measured as
the thoroughness of the eye examination. The results suggest that quality
is not affected by the presence of the commercial practice restrictions. In
the first quality regression the sum of the coefficients of the commercial
practice restrictions is - 17.8 percent, which is not significantly different
from zero at the 1 percent level (F = 2.04). The summed coefficients of
the commercial practice restrictions in the second quality regression
equal -14.6 percent, again not statistically significant at the 1 percent
level (F = 2.29). The results do not support the argument made by propo49

Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5, at 4.
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nents of the commercial practice restrictions that the restrictions will
increase the quality of ophthalmic services.
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

In 1977 the four commercial practice restrictions appear to have increased the price of an eye examination and pair of eyeglasses by at least
5-13 percent, holding quality constant, measured as the thoroughness of
the eye examination and accuracy of the eyeglass prescription. And to
reiterate, the commercial practice restrictions did not appear to increase
the quality of ophthalmic services. These results provide support for the
economic theory of regulation and for a recent extension of the economic
theory of regulation, that subgroups of firms within an industry will use
the regulatory process to increase their rivals' costs and, therefore, their
own market power.
Consumers paid at least $4.7 million more for eye examinations and
eyeglasses in 1977 because of the four commercial practice restrictions.50
Further, part of this $4.7 million is a social cost rather than an income
transfer. Regulation-induced inefficiencies in production account for
some of the price increase. The four commercial practice restrictions may
inhibit optometrists' potential to realize economies of scale, the employment restriction may inhibit nonprofessional optical firms' potential to
realize economies of scope, and the branch office restriction may prevent
optometrists from employing the cost-minimizing combination of inputs.
Also the opportunity costs of resources used by optometrists to influence
the political process to attain market power through commercial practice
laws and regulations are social costs.51
This paper suggests that commercial practice restrictions in the
ophthalmic market are not protecting the consumer. The commercial
practice restrictions increase price and have a statistically insignificant
effect on quality. Intervention strategies should correct the market failure
without causing serious distortions that lead to even greater consumer
injury.
50 This estimate is based on the four
restrictions increasing price by $19, each optometrist
providing 1,422 eye examinations and pairs of eyeglasses a year, American Optometric
Association News, August 1, 1981; 18,589 optometrists practicing in states with trade name
restrictions, 10,844 optometrists practicing in states with branch office restrictions, 8,613
optometrists practicing in states with location restrictions, and 14,750 optometrists practicing in states with employment restrictions, letter from Farrell Aron, Director of Statistical
Research, American Optometric Association, September 15, 1982.
51 See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ.
807 (1975).
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